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ARE DEBT-FOR-CLIMATE SWAPS MORALLY PERMISSIBLE?i

I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental degradation is a problem as immense in scope as it is horrific in detail.
Climate change, in particular, threatens many species and ecosystems.ii Failing to mitigate climate
change risks inter alia stronger hurricanes, massive droughts, loss of biodiversity, the spread of
disease, and the long-term flooding of coastal areas around the world.iii Another problem as
immense and horrific as environmental degradation is extreme poverty. Over 1 billion people are
living in extreme poverty, unable to secure adequate food, shelter, clothing, healthcare, clean
water and sanitation.iv Eighteen million people die every year from such poverty-related causes as
malaria, AIDS, and starvation.v Debt-for-climate swaps might help to solve both problems.
Debt-for-climate swaps (and, more generally, debt-for-nature swaps) are agreements
between creditors – either developed countries or international financial institutions – and
developing country debtors. In bilateral swaps, a creditor agrees to forgive a developing country’s
debt on the condition that the developing country fund and implement a domestic environmental
program (e.g., to preserve forests). Generally, non-governmental conservation organizations such
as the World Wildlife Fund or Conservation International broker these bilateral swaps.
Sometimes, however, debt-for-climate swaps are three-party agreements between a creditor, a
non-governmental conservation organization, and a developing country debtor. In commercial
swaps, creditors sell a developing country’s debt to a conservation organization at a reduced rate.
Then the conservation organization agrees to forgive part or all of the debt so long as the
developing country funds and implements a domestic conservation program.vi Dozens of
countries have participated in debt-for-climate (and other debt-for-nature) swaps.vii
Environmentalists praise such swaps for their potential to mitigate environmental
degradation.viii In 2002 debt-for-nature swaps topped Time Magazine’s list of most promising
conservation strategies and the recent climate crisis has added impetus to the move towards debt-
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for-climate swaps.ix Such swaps have already helped create large nature preserves. In 1987, for
instance, Conservation International brokered a swap that created Bolivia's Beni Biosphere
Reserve.x In 2007, Peru agreed to protect ‘7.5 million acres of tropical rain forest containing pink
river dolphins, jaguars, scarlet macaws and giant water lilies.’xi And more recently, in 2009,
Conservation International brokered a swap that will purportedly preserve Sumatra’s forests and
protect its many endangered species.xii
Others praise debt-for-climate (and nature) swaps for their potential to alleviate extreme
poverty.xiii Developing countries often face crushing international debt burdens, which can
interfere with their ability to eliminate – or, at least, alleviate – extreme poverty within their
borders.xiv Because debt-for-climate swaps reduce the amount of money developing countries
must spend servicing their debts, such swaps may help these countries lift their people out of
extreme poverty.xv At first blush, then, debt-for-climate swaps seem to provide win-win solutions
to the problems of environmental degradation and extreme poverty. As such, one might naturally
assume that debt-for-climate swaps are morally permissible, if not morally obligatory.
This paper will argue that, appearances not withstanding, debt-for-climate swaps may
sometimes be morally questionable, if not impermissible. The upshot of the paper is threefold:
first, it is unwise to assume without scrutiny that any particular debt-for-climate swap is morally
permissible; second, and more generally, it is important to exercise some degree of moral
imagination when reflecting on the permissibility of actions for which there are allegedly no
better alternatives; third, it may turn out that national and international policies, rules, and
institutions must change in order to make many seemingly innocuous or even good policies or
actions like debt-for-climate swaps permissible.
Our argument is motivated by an analogy between international loans and debt-forclimate swaps. In particular, the argument draws on structural similarities between the economic
conditions traditionally placed on international loans to developing countries (economic
conditionality)

and
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(environmental conditionality). So, after setting out the moral framework we use to evaluate the
permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps, we will discuss some moral problems that have been
attributed to economic conditionality. We will then show how similar problems may apply to
debt-for-climate swaps both in theory and in practice. Finally, we will entertain some objections
to our argument.
Inquiry into the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps is important in the context of
debates about how we should mitigate climate change. Consider that, as a result of its Tropical
Forest Conservation Act, the U.S. signed twelve debt-for-nature agreements with countries
including Panama, Bangladesh, Botswana, Belize, Costa Rica, Colombia, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and the Philippines.xvi By 2006, the U.S. had
already saved a million acres of forest with such swaps.xvii If we use what seems to be a
conservative estimate of .5 metric tons of carbon saved per acre, then these swaps have saved
around 500,000 metric tons of carbon from entering the atmosphere per year. (For a frame of
reference, global emissions are about 7 billion tons per year.)xviii Furthermore, as some developing
countries have proposed that they be allowed to sell their carbon credits in exchange for debt
relief, it seems that debt-for-climate swaps hold great potential for dealing with global climate
change, whether used in lieu of, or in addition to, traditional carbon trading programs.xix Although
many discuss the permissibility of different carbon-trading regimes, we know of few papers
examining the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTREME POVERTY
This paper will work within a human rights framework, which assumes that we all
possess human rights in virtue of our humanity and that we all have an equal claim to their
fulfillment.xx Human rights have traditionally been understood as the rights necessary to secure
individuals’ basic interests and/or autonomy.xxi To stay neutral between these competing accounts
of human rights, however, this paper will simply say that people have a human right to the things
they need to secure a minimally decent life (so that whatever interests or autonomy individuals
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must be able to secure are included here).xxii We have human rights to those things that are
necessary for living a minimally decent life and against those things that are detrimental to living
a minimally decent life.xxiii
On this framework, we have a human right against extreme poverty—or, alternatively, a
human right to what we need in order to avoid extreme poverty. For extreme poverty poses a
common threat to individuals’ ability to live minimally decent lives. It is worth noting how
uncontroversial this assumption is. Whatever a minimally decent life requires, surely it requires at
least those things essential for sustaining life itself, and these are ex hypothesi the very things put
at risk by extreme poverty.
Now supposing that everyone has a human right against extreme poverty, it is incumbent
on us (i.e., humanity) to ameliorate it. But just what does it mean to lay responsibility for securing
the human rights of everyone at the doorstep of humanity? What does it mean to say the duties
that arise from human rights are duties of humanity? Here, we might follow James Nickel who
provides a clear and plausible answer:
(1) governments are the primary addressees of the human rights of their residents, with
duties both to respect and to uphold their human rights; (2) governments have negative
duties to respect the rights of people from other countries; (3) individuals have negative
responsibilities to respect the human rights of people at home and abroad; (4) individuals
have responsibilities as voters and citizens to promote human rights in their own country;
and (5) governments, international organizations and individuals have back-up
responsibilities for the fulfillment of human rights around the world.xxiv
It is helpful to separate the negative duties from the positive duties that arise from human
rights. On the one hand, negative duties that arise from human rights are addressed to all of
humanity all of the time: each of us, along with our governments, and non-governmental
organizations, has a duty to avoid taking actions, implementing policies, and supporting
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institutions that help undermine human rights anywhere at anytime.xxv It is, for instance, always
incumbent on both Kenyans and U.S. citizens, along with the Kenyan government and the United
States government, and (say) the World Bank and the World Wildlife Fund, to avoid taking
actions, implementing policies, and supporting institutions that undermine the human rights of
either Kenyans or Americans in this way (henceforth simply undermine). On the other hand,
positive duties that arise from human rights are not addressed to all of humanity. Rather, they
begin as domestic duties and, if necessary, become international duties.xxvi It is, for instance, the
primary duty of the Kenyan government – not (say) the United States government, the World
Bank, or the World Wildlife Fund – to take actions, implement policies, and support institutions
that secure the human rights of Kenyans. Similarly, it is the primary duty of the United States
government – not (say) the Kenyan government, the World Bank, or the World Wildlife Fund –
to take actions, implement policies, and support institutions that secure the human rights of U.S.
citizens. When a country is unable to secure the human rights of its people, however, it becomes a
secondary (positive) duty of the international community – requiring not just states but
individuals and non-governmental organizations – to assist. So, for instance, if the Kenyan
government is unable to secure the human rights of its people, and if the United States
government has already fulfilled its primary duty to secure the human rights of its people, then,
other things being equal, it is the responsibility of the United States government – along with
similarly capable members of the international community – to assist in securing the human rights
of Kenyans.xxvii
There is even some basis for this interpretation of the duties correlative to human rights
in international law. Consider, for instance, Article 2(1) of the international covenant on
economic and social rights, part of the UN declaration of human rights as explicated in the
general comments.xxviii It says that to fulfill rights:
Each State Party to the present Covenant …[must undertake]… steps, individually
and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and
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technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative
measures.
The third general comment states:
The Committee notes that the phrase [in Article 2(1)] ‘to the maximum of its
available resources’ was intended by the drafters of the Covenant to refer to both
the resources existing within a State and those available from the international
community through international cooperation and assistance. The Committee
wishes to emphasize that in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of
the United Nations, with well-established principles of international law, and with
the provisions of the Covenant itself, international cooperation for development
and thus for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation
of all States. It is particularly incumbent upon those States which are in a position
to assist others in this regard.xxix
In other words, although states have the primary obligation of ensuring that their subjects’ human
rights are secure, other states and international organizations that are well placed to do so must
provide assistance if necessary.
One might question the above human rights framework on which everyone has a human
right against extreme poverty that gives rise to high-priority duties (on humanity) to ameliorate
extreme poverty. Specifically, one might wonder just how demanding the duty on humanity to
ameliorate extreme poverty should be.
Our answer to this question is simple: humanity must ameliorate extreme poverty as
much as possible without sacrificing something of comparable moral significance.xxx Of course,
one might then wonder what sorts of goals compare with ameliorating extreme poverty. Or, more
generally, one might wonder what justifies us in adopting this human rights framework in the first
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place. However, such questions go beyond the scope of this paper. It simply assumes that the
above moral framework is justifiable. This is not to say that adopting a human rights framework
is uncontroversial, but rather that (provisionally) doing so can help to illuminate potential moral
shortcomings in the case of debt-for-climate swaps. Before using this framework to assess the
morality of debt-for-climate swaps, however, it is helpful to consider some problems associated
with structurally similar international loans.
III. INTERNATIONAL LOANS AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONALITY
Loans are conditional. Creditors make loans on the condition that their debtors will pay
them back, usually with interest. In international lending, however, economic conditionality has
become more complex and restrictive. Developing countries seeking international loans –
whether from more affluent countries or international financial institutions like the World Bank
or International Monetary Fund – must often agree to implement economic reforms designed to
promote macroeconomic stability and growth. They may require countries to:
•

Liberalize trade (say) by reducing tariff and non-tariff trade barriers.

•

Liberalize financial markets (say) by allowing world markets to dictate exchange
rates or devalue local currencies against hard currencies such as the dollar.

•

Diminish the role of the state in guiding the economy (say) by privatizing major
sectors of the economy, decreasing government bureaucracy, and reducing
spending on such things as healthcare, education, and welfare.xxxi

In short, international loans have traditionally been conditional on liberalization, deregulation,
and privatization. Although the conditions on international loans continue to evolve in order to
address worries about their timing, content, and efficacy, most international creditors remain
committed to advancing these kinds of reforms.xxxii
Some international loans that have traditional economic conditions attached are morally
questionable, if not impermissible. At least such loans are impermissible if they undermine the
ability of debtor countries to protect the human rights of their people now or in the future. Given
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the moral framework set forth in §II, it is the duty of humanity to ensure that all people are able to
live minimally decent lives. On this view, an international loan is permissible only if it protects
the human rights of people whose lives are affected by it. So, if meeting the conditions on an
international loan prevents a debtor country from protecting its people from extreme poverty, the
loan is prima facie impermissible. International creditors – whether countries or international
financial institutions – have a duty to ensure that the conditions they place on their loans preserve
the ability of debtor countries to protect their people from extreme poverty. That is to say,
international loans ought to be sustainable: as we will understand ‘sustainability,’ an international
loan is sustainable only if the debtor country can protect its people from extreme poverty while
servicing the conditions of the loan.
Although this way of construing sustainability might sound unorthodox, it is at least
closely connected to the traditional understanding. To be sustainable, a practice must not
compromise the fundamental interests or autonomy of individuals in present or future
generations. Although questions about sustainability are most often asked in the context of
environmental practices, they can just as well be asked in the context of economic practices.
Finally, while this paper focuses on the human interests associated with sustainability, nothing we
say here precludes the relevance of environmental interests to questions of sustainability.
Unfortunately, there appear to be real-world cases in which international loans with
traditional economic conditions attached are unsustainable. In 1998, for instance, the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund worked with the Bolivian government to privatize its public
enterprises – including Bolivia’s water company (SEMAPA) – as a condition of giving Bolivia a
loan.xxxiii Subsequently, when the Bechtel Corporation took over the Bolivian water supply, many
poor Bolivians saw their water bills triple or quadruple. In March 2000, Bolivians took to the
streets in protest—demanding affordable water. Although Bechtel eventually relented,xxxiv it
appears that Bolivia was unable to protect the human rights of its people while servicing the
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conditions on its loan. If so, the requirement on Bolivia to privatize its water supply was
unsustainable and, therefore, morally questionable.
In another case, the International Monetary Fund required Ecuador to privatize its water
and sewage system as a condition of giving Ecuador a loan. Although service improved in some
respects, poor infrastructure led to an outbreak of hepatitis A, and poor Ecuadorians suffered as
prices rose and subsidies were eliminated. As a result, some suggest that, in some parts of
Ecuador, the poor were unable gain access to clean water and sanitation: 76% of the residents of
Plan Piloto, for instance, characterized their water as ‘turbulent and foul smelling’; 45% said it
was ‘yellow or dark’; and 74% said it smelled like feces.xxxv It thus appears that Ecuador was
unable to protect the human rights of its people while servicing the conditions on its loan. If so,
the requirement on Ecuador to privatize its water and sewage system was unsustainable and,
therefore, morally questionable.
Finally, in a third case, the International Monetary Fund pressured Niger to put a 19
percent value-added tax on goods – including foodstuffs – as a condition of giving Niger a loan.
The tax was levied even though food costs had risen more than 75 percent in the previous five
years, and even though Niger’s nomadic herders’ main source of income (livestock) had fallen 25
percent in value.xxxvi Although causation is notoriously hard to prove, there was famine in Niger
that year, and the tax may well have been an aggravating factor.xxxvii It thus appears that Niger
was unable to protect the human rights of its people while servicing the conditions on its loan. If
so, the requirement on Niger to impose a 19 percent value-added tax on goods – including
foodstuffs – was unsustainable and, therefore, morally questionable.
IV. DEBT-FOR-CLIMATE SWAPS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONALITY
Now we turn to the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps. International loans with
traditional conditions attached are structurally similar to debt-for-climate swaps. Just as
international loans require debtor countries to institute certain economic programs, debt-forclimate swaps require debtor countries to institute certain environmental programs. Both
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institutions exhibit the following structure: Creditor C will do X for debtor country D if and only
if D institutes program P. The moral framework set out in §II places a sustainability condition on
all such transactions: if a debtor country D is unable to institute program P while securing the
human rights of its people (say, by protecting them from extreme poverty), then the transaction in
question – whether an international loan or a debt-for-climate swap – is morally questionable, if
not impermissible. We know from our discussion in §III that at least some international loans
with traditional conditions attached are morally questionable for this reason, and, given the
structural similarity between such loans and debt-for-climate swaps, we have reason to subject
debt-for-climate swaps to a similar level of moral scrutiny.
Although debt-for-climate swaps are supposed to reduce a debtor country’s international
debt burden, this may not be enough for those offering such swaps to have discharged their moral
duties to the people in that country. Whether those offering (or brokering) debt-for-climate swaps
have discharged these duties depends on whether the swaps are sustainable—a matter for
empirical inquiry. Such inquiry must examine whether a debtor country can fulfill the conditions
on a debt-for-climate swap while maintaining the necessary economic growth, domestic
infrastructure, and/or redistributive mechanisms sufficient for securing the human rights of its
people. Suppose, for instance, that the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) brokers a debt-for-climate
swap between the U.S. and Indonesia, in which the U.S. agrees to forgive US$100 million of
Indonesian debt so long as Indonesia agrees to institute a US$20 million conservation program
designed to protect its tropical rainforest. The permissibility of such a swap will depend on inter
alia its sustainability: the US$20 million conservation program must not prevent Indonesia from
maintaining the economic growth, infrastructure, and redistributive mechanisms necessary to
protect current and future generations of Indonesians from extreme poverty.
One might object that a debt-for-climate swap is permissible as long as it benefits a
debtor country and its people. Rather than sustainability, one might say, perhaps the appropriate
moral standard is that a swap just leave a country better able to secure the rights of its people.
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Indeed, one might insist that swaps are only problematic if they make a country less able to
secure the rights of its people.xxxviii
While this may be so on some moral framework, it is not so on the human rights
framework set out in §II. This is because a swap can lighten a country’s debt burden, increase its
ability to fulfill the rights of its people, and still prevent the country from completely fulfilling
these rights. Suppose, for instance, the U.S. offers to reduce Indonesia’s debt obligations if it
agrees to create a nature reserve in a debt-for-climate swap. Even if the swap improves
Indonesia’s political power and the average welfare of Indonesians, for instance, creating the
reserve could still make it more difficult (if not impossible) for Indonesia to help the very poor
meet their basic needs. So, the permissibility of a debt-for-climate swap depends not simply on
whether the debtor country and its people benefit from the swap. It also matters whether the
country can protect its people from extreme poverty while fulfilling the environmental conditions
placed on the swap.
Nonetheless, there may be cases in which a particular debt-for-nature swap is the best a
creditor (or broker) can do to help a debtor country protect its people from extreme poverty.
Perhaps the level of poverty, or the level of environmental degradation, is just that severe. Such
cases present terrible choices, where creditors (or brokers) must choose between making an
otherwise impermissible offer and doing what (say) has better consequences for the poor or the
environment. If an unsustainable debt-for-nature swap happens to be the morally best option
available to a creditor (or broker), then offering (or brokering) the swap may be the right thing to
do in the circumstances. But this is a terrible choice even if it’s easy to make and no one is
blameworthy for having to make it.
By classifying the right choice as terrible, one expresses an abiding interest in avoiding
circumstances where we are forced to make ourselves complicit – however blamelessly – in the
perpetuation of extreme poverty and, other things being equal, the violation of human rights.xxxix
The importance of this point cannot be overstated, since it is precisely by doing this that we can
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guard against failures of imagination which result in the unnecessary perpetuation of extreme
poverty and human rights violations. Because the permissibility of offering (or brokering) an
unsustainable debt-for-climate swap depends on the absence of better options, we must be sure to
exhaust our imaginations before concluding that our best option is an unsustainable debt-forclimate swap. If we fail to exhaust our imaginations in the effort to find feasible alternatives to
unsustainable debt-for-climate swaps, then we make ourselves not only complicit but culpable in
the perpetuation of extreme poverty and violation of human rights.xl Indeed, this is the more
general thrust of our argument: we must ensure that debt-for-climate swaps, which seem
wonderful on the surface, do not provide creditors and brokers with an all-too-easy excuse for
their conduct in a world that allows for the perpetuation of extreme poverty.
So far this paper has argued that debt-for-climate swaps are morally questionable when
they are unsustainable, but there are likely other salient conditions on their permissibility—in
addition to sustainability. We have thus far assumed that the debt being swapped for nature in
debt-for-climate swaps comes from valid loans. But this need not be the case. The original loan
could be odious. Odious loans are either (1) accepted by those without legitimate authority or (2)
used for purposes that do not benefit the debtor country or its inhabitants.xli If, for instance, a
dictator accepts a loan and embezzles the money, then that country’s citizens should not be held
to account. Other things being equal, these loans are invalid. So it seems that the permissibility of
debt-for-climate swaps will be contingent on the validity of the original loans underlying the
swaps. If those involved in offering (or brokering) a debt-for-climate swap know (or should have
known) that the original loan is invalid – say, because it’s odious or unsustainable –, then it may
well be impermissible to offer (or broker) the swap.
More generally, creditors and brokers in debt-for-climate swaps must be acting in good
faith. A colloquial example is helpful here. If one buys a Bose speaker system from Target, then
one gains valid title to the speakers even if they turn out to have been stolen, since it is rarely (if
ever) the case that goods sold at Target are stolen. If, however, one buys a Bose speaker system
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from a pawn shop, then the title may be invalid, since it is commonly the case that goods sold at
pawn shops are stolen. As Leif Wenar explains:
In order for a purchaser to act in good faith, it must be reasonable for him to believe that he
is dealing with a genuine vendor—one with neither void nor voidable title. It must be
reasonable, that is, for the purchaser to believe either that the vendor is the owner of the
good or that the owner has authorized the vendor while free from deception, duress, or
undue influence.xlii
Similarly, if those offering (or brokering) a debt-for-climate swap are acting in bad faith, they
have no right to insist that the debtor country meet the environmental conditions placed on the
swap.
There may also be other conditions on the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps,
though this paper will not focus upon them. Loans may, for instance, be impermissible because
they are exploitative.xliii Exploitative loans are offered by creditors who use their disproportionate
bargaining power to coerce debtors into accepting conditions that would not otherwise be
reasonable to accept. A debt-for-climate swap could be impermissible because it is based on an
exploitative loan, or because the swap itself is exploitative. For the sake of brevity, however,
what follows will focus only on the sustainability and good-faith conditions for permissibility.
Let us now turn to debt-for-climate (and, more generally, debt-for-nature) swaps in
practice. Do real cases of debt-for-climate (or nature) swaps always (or generally) satisfy the
conditions on permissibility set forth in §IV? Assuming the goodwill of all participating parties,
this section will suggest that many may not. Debtor countries in debt-for-climate swaps (almost)
invariably face unsustainable debt burdens. For this reason, it seems that those who offer (or
broker) debt-for-climate swaps may be acting in bad faith—especially, since there is often little
reason to think that the swaps will be sustainable.
Many poor countries are highly indebted with debt-to-export ratios of over 200
percent.xliv Often poor countries’ debt servicing obligations exceed all sources of government
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revenue. Econometric estimates give us reason to believe many of these countries’ debts are
unsustainable as on our definition as well as many others. The international financial institutions,
for instance, suggest that many countries are unable to service their obligations even when they
cut services to the poor.xlv
A recent Jubilee report provides further evidence that massive debt is likely to prevent
very poor countries from securing the human rights of their people. This report created a model
for Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda on which these countries cannot continue to
service their projected debt burdens while meeting the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of
cutting extreme poverty in half by 2015.xlvi In the case of Malawi, for instance, the report projects
that, by 2015, Malawi would ‘have a debt burden of at least 276% of GDP’xlvii even if Malawi
tried to meet the MDG by excluding its existing debt and securing new loans. The report
concludes that ‘if Malawi financed the MDG cost gap through such borrowing, it would be
completely unsustainable.’xlviii It is hard to see how countries that have to spend all of their money
servicing massive debts will be able to protect their citizens’ human rights from one generation to
the next. If they are not able to do so, then, as discussed in §III above, the international loans that
originally created the unsustainable debts are morally questionable, if not impermissible, and so,
by extension, are any debt-for-climate swaps that serve to perpetuate such unsustainable debts in
the form of environmental conditionality.
One might object that the evidence does not show that swaps are undermining human
rights in any respect. Without the swaps poor countries and their people would be worse off. The
swaps, instead, improve countries’ ability to fulfill their subjects’ human rights.
If one agrees, however, that traditional economic conditionality undermines human
rights, one should agree that debt-for-climate swaps do so. For, the structure of debt-for-climate
swaps is the same as the structure of traditional economic conditionality: Creditor C will do X for
debtor country D if and only if D institutes program P. The moral framework set out in §II places
a sustainability condition on all such transactions: if a debtor country D is unable to institute
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program P while securing the human rights of its people (say, by protecting them from extreme
poverty), then the transaction in question – whether an international loan or a debt-for-climate
swap – is morally questionable, if not impermissible. It does not matter if, without P, some other
requirement R (e.g., the original conditions on a loan) were in place that would also undermine a
country’s ability to fulfill even the same people’s human rights. The basic principle does not
include an exception for cases where more people's rights are fulfilled or fewer undermined with
P in place.
In light of these reflections, there is reason to worry that some debt-for-climate (or
nature) swaps are impermissible. Some highly-indebted poor countries (HIPC) -- including
Bolivia, Honduras, and Nicaragua -- have already received debt-for-climate (or other debt-fornature) swaps.xlix At least, one should be just as inclined to question the permissibility of debt-forclimate swaps as one is to question the permissibility of the international loans on which they are
based.
Furthermore, many of the debts developing countries bear were taken on by corrupt and
treacherous rulers who did not use the loans to benefit their country or their people. Nor did the
countries or institutions making these loans have good reason to think that these rulers would use
the loans to aid the extremely poor. Ostensibly, then, there are many odious debts. For instance,
much of the Philippines’ debt acquired under Marcos, or Indonesia’s debt acquired under
Suharto, is odious.l And yet, creditors have offered both the Philippines and Indonesia debt-forclimate (and nature) swaps.li While more evidence is needed to establish that the creditors (or
brokers) in these swaps were acting in bad faith, it seems that suspicion is warranted.
As noted above, there may be cases in which the best option available to those offering
(or brokering) debt-for-climate swaps is to offer (or broker) an unsustainable or bad faith swap. If
that is the best they can do, then it may be better than doing nothing. But, again, this is a terrible
choice, even if no one is blameworthy for having to make it.
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V. OBJECTIONS
Are debt-for-climate swaps uniquely wrong?
One might object that the paper has done nothing to show that anything is distinctively
wrong (or questionable) about debt-for-climate swaps. After all, what are debt-for-climate swaps,
but creative attempts by well-meaning people to address the problem of environmental
degradation while simultaneously lessening the massive debt burdens of developing countries?
Surely there is nothing wrong with this, and just as surely, one might argue, the paper has done
nothing to locate the potential wrongness of debt-for-climate swaps in its analysis of the swaps
themselves.
While this objection is correct in claiming that the paper does not account for the
distinctive wrongness of debt-for-climate swaps, we believe this objection implies an absurd
standard for evaluating the moral status of debt-for-climate swaps, or anything else for that
matter.lii The fact that debt-for-climate swaps might be impermissible for the same reason(s) that
other kinds of acts are impermissible does not vitiate the claim that there is reason to worry that
something is wrong with debt-for-climate swaps. If, for instance, one were to argue that factory
farming is wrong because it violates the principle of utility, it would be no defense of factory
farming to respond by saying that many things can violate the principle of utility. Similarly, if one
were to argue that lying is wrong because it violates the Categorical Imperative, it would be no
defense of lying to respond by saying that many things can violate the Categorical Imperative.
We argue that debt-for-climate swaps are morally questionable because those offering (or
brokering) the swap may thereby fail to fulfill their positive obligations to the poor, if not
undermine these rights. It is no defense of debt-for-climate swaps to respond by saying that there
are other ways people can fail to fulfill the obligations correlative to human rights. In short,
different acts can be impermissible for the same reason.
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Are we asking too much of debt-for-climate swaps?
One might still object that we are asking too much of debt-for-climate swaps when we
make their permissibility contingent on how they impact the poor. Extreme poverty exists for a
variety of reasons that have little or nothing to do with debt-for-climate swaps themselves,
including the economic actions and policies of corporations, affluent countries, international
financial institutions, and vicious dictators. In this context, one might argue, it is a mistake to
conclude that debt-for-climate swaps are morally questionable, if not impermissible, simply
because they fail to make a non-ideal world ideal.
Again, we believe this objection misses the thrust of the paper’s argument. Our point is
that the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps depends on how they impact individuals’ basic
human rights. We do not conclude, as the objection suggests, that the permissibility of debt-forclimate swaps depends on whether they provide a panacea to extreme poverty, much less all the
world’s ills. That said, we do suppose that the circumstances in which one offers (or brokers) a
debt-for-climate swap are relevant to its permissibility, since how a debt-for-climate swap affects
people’s ability to secure the objects of their human rights will depend on background facts over
which those who offer or broker the swap have no control. It makes sense to judge the
permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps – or anything else for that matter – in accordance with
their real-world effects, not in accordance with the effects they would have had were the world a
much different place. Presumably, we are responsible for the actual (if foreseeable) consequences
of our actions, not the counter-factual consequences of our actions. For instance, we cannot
excuse ourselves for pushing somebody off the edge of a cliff simply by pointing out that (a) we
were not responsible for him standing at the edge of a cliff, and that (b) our push would not have
sent him over the cliff were he standing in the middle of a cornfield. Similarly, creditors and
brokers of debt-for-climate swaps cannot excuse themselves from pushing people into extreme
poverty simply by pointing out that (a) they were not responsible for such people being on the
edge of extreme poverty, and that (b) the debt-for-climate swap would not have pushed people
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into extreme poverty were the economic actions and policies of affluent countries, corporations,
international financial institutions, or vicious dictators different. A similar argument applies in
cases where, given existing background conditions, debt-for-climate swaps merely prevent people
from escaping extreme poverty.
Furthermore, the fact that the world might have to change in certain ways in order for
certain debt-for-climate swaps to be permissible does not undermine the paper’s argument.
Rather, it expands the significance and import of the paper, since there likely are ways of
changing national and international policies, rules, and institutions so that they protect human
rights better than the status quo. Thomas Pogge has argued, for instance, that we should collect a
global tax on the use of natural resources and use the dividends to ameliorate extreme poverty.liii
And one of us has argued elsewhere that there are ways of changing the rules of trade and aid that
could greatly help the poor.liv No matter the efficacy of any specific proposal, however, the
paper’s general conclusion still stands: the permissibility of debt-for-climate swaps depends (in
part) on whether the international community exercises its collective imagination in the effort to
eliminate extreme poverty.
Again, this is not to deny that there may well be cases in which an unsustainable or bad
faith debt-for-climate swap is the best option available. But, as argued in §IV, we should make
every effort to avoid having to make such terrible choices—even if circumstances ultimately
dictate that no one is blameworthy for having to make them.
What about the value of nature?
One might object that protecting nature is just as important as, if not more important than,
securing human rights. So, the objector might suggest, a moral framework based solely on human
rights, which lacks an environmental ethic, is inadequate to morally evaluate debt-for-climate
swaps. Some might argue, for instance, that there is an obligation to give equal consideration to
animal interests,lv to treat all teleological subjects of a life as members of our moral community,lvi
or to protect species, ecosystems, and the biosphere for their own sake.lvii These people might
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claim that, even if debt-for-climate swaps undermine the ability of people to avoid extreme
poverty, they are permissible so long as they succeed in protecting the environment. Indeed, if a
debt-for-climate swap will help mitigate the effects of climate change, or save some species from
extinction, then such a swap may well be obligatory. After all, many environmentalists have
argued for similar conclusions.lviii
We believe, however, that this objection removes both extreme poverty and
environmental degradation from their proper context. A concern for the poor and the environment
are interconnected. Those who care about extreme poverty have a reason to care about
environmental degradation and vice-versa.lix
First, the poor are extremely vulnerable to environmental problems like climate change.
Natural disasters and famines have harmed or resulted in the deaths of billions of poor people
over the course of the last decade.lx Hundreds of thousands of poor people die every year from
infectious diseases like malaria.lxi And environmental problems like climate change are likely to
aggravate the harms to people that result from such natural causes.lxii Moreover, because people
in extreme poverty are the most exposed to environmental degradation and the least able to adapt
to changing environmental conditions,lxiii they are likely to suffer most from the effects of
environmental problems like climate change.lxiv Thus, people who care about ameliorating
extreme poverty on human rights grounds have a reason to care about mitigating environmental
problems like climate change.
Second, the poor, collectively, contribute a surprising amount to environmental
degradation by using scarce sinks (like forests) that absorb wastes such as (excess) carbon
dioxide.lxv For instance, swidden (or slash and burn) agriculture – usually employed by poor
farmers who want to plant crops or raise cattle on marginal lands – causes immense deforestation.
Poor people, who lack access to electricity or gas, also burn lots of wood and coal to cook their
meals and heat their homes.lxvi Moreover, developing country emissions will rise as they start
using more fossil fuel, and it is estimated that developing countries will emit more carbon dioxide
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than industrialized countries by about 2018.lxvii People who care about mitigating environmental
problems like climate change thus have a reason to care about ameliorating extreme poverty.
Because extreme poverty and environmental degradation are interconnected, conflict
between the imperatives to protect human rights and the environment is by no means certain. An
unsustainable debt-for-climate swap that exacerbates extreme poverty may likewise exacerbate
environmental degradation. Consider, for instance, the debt-for-climate swap that created the
Beni Biosphere Reserve in Bolivia. The Tsimane' Indians who live in the reserve increase
foraging and forest clearing when they are otherwise unable to meet their basic needs. These
activities have the potential to devastate the reserve and undermine the environmental aims of the
swap.lxviii Therefore, whether the Bolivian swap will mitigate, or exacerbate, environmental
degradation depends on whether it will protect the ability of the Tsimane’ Indians to meet their
basic needs. So, while debt-for-climate swaps hold out the hope of providing win-win solutions to
the problems of environmental degradation and extreme poverty, unsustainable debt-for-climate
swaps may well fail on both counts. Of course, the possibility of an intractable conflict between
the needs of nature and the needs of people remains, but, again, this is compatible with the claim
that unsustainable and bad faith debt-for-climate swaps are morally questionable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Debt-for-climate swaps appear to provide win-win solutions to the very large and horrific
problems of environmental degradation and extreme poverty. We do not question the intentions
of those who would offer (or broker) debt-for-climate swaps, and we believe that they may well
have a role to play in the larger efforts to confront these problems. Nevertheless, this paper has
argued that, appearances notwithstanding, debt-for-climate swaps are sometimes morally
questionable, if not impermissible. Putting aside cases in which terrible choices must be made,
debt-for-climate swaps, like international loans, are permissible only if they are sustainable and
offered (or brokered) in good faith. Unfortunately, like many international loans, there is reason
to worry that some real-world debt-for-climate (or nature) swaps have, in fact, been
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impermissible. In any case, the practical upshot of the paper is that creditors and brokers of debtfor-climate swaps must be vigilant to avoid offering (or brokering) unsustainable or bad faith
swaps. Such vigilance requires that creditors and brokers of debt-for-climate swaps use their
imaginations in order to avoid having to make terrible choices between mitigating environmental
degradation and protecting people from extreme poverty.
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